This paper examines the development of legal contract enforcement in a political economy context. The key insight is that, in earlier times when relational contracts are used predominantly, the rich elite agents must have enjoyed comparative advantages in using relational contracts than the poor and thus would bene…t less from investing in legal enforcement. The paper …nds that high income inequality, the elite rule, and slow legal development constitute a cluster of institutions that are mutually reinforcing each other. The existence of social communities improves contract enforcement through multilateral relationships among agents within the same community, but it tends to slow down legal development.
Introduction
Most economic transactions are prone to the risk of default by contracting partners, even though they are mutually bene…cial when relevant parties act honestly. How to reduce such risk is thus essential to achieve collectively e¢ cient outcomes from voluntary exchanges.
This problem is as old as human society and may become more severe over time as the growing specialization in the economy generates more frequent and complex economic exchanges among agents. stream of bene…ts is large enough to prevent short-sighted cheating today. In a multilateral environment such as a close-knit ethnic group or social communities, credible information of one's past behaviors can be circulated at a low cost so that individual reputations can be developed and punishment carried out at the communal level (Landa 1981 , Ellickson 1991 , Bernstein 1992 , Whyte 1996 , Greif 1994 , Dixit 2009 ). When it becomes more productive to trade with strangers outside one's community, the legal system is often relied upon to enforce contracts at the society level.
These di¤erent contract enforcement institutions have comparative advantages over each other and thus are usually coexisting in many societies (Ellickson 1991, Durlauf and Fafchamps 2005) . Their relative prevalence, however, di¤ers across society in an important way. The prevalence of legal contracts is typically associated with a well-developed economy with low income inequality, a high quality legal system, and a democratic political regime, while a heavy reliance on informal relationships is associated with developing countries (North 1991 It is useful to note that, while the informal contract enforcement at individual and communal levels seems to have been functioning spontaneously from early on, legal enforcement appears much later in history and it in general needs intentional public investment to establish (Greif 2002 (Greif , 2005 . For instance, the establishment of legal courts, the development of legal codes and procedures, the training of judges, lawyers, and the police force are all needed for the legal system to work. So the legal investment is a costly public good, whose provision is to a large degree determined by the political regime and the amount of bene…ts of using legal enforcement versus relational contracts.
Relational contracts secure cooperation by promising future gains in an established relationship. The need to stay with current partners, however, makes individuals reluctant to do business with new partners even though they are more productive than the old ones.
In contrast, legal contracts use an impersonal third party, the legal court, to deter cheating, and thus free agents from the burden of maintaining less productive relationships. 1 So the more productive the new matches are relative the old ones, the higher the returns of using legal enforcement, and the larger the incentives to invest in the legal system. Agents, however, may di¤er in terms of how productive their established partnerships are. For example, those better connected, more educated, or owning better projects may enjoy higher gains from trade in using long-term relational contracts than others, and thus belong to the rich elite when relational contracts are used predominantly. When new trade opportunities arise, these traditional elite gain less than others from breaking up old partnerships and forming new ones with strangers, and hence have less incentives to improve the legal quality that reduces the cost of contracting with strangers. 2 It is then not surprising that legal development will be slower when the rich elite are politically dominant, which is more likely to happen when the endowment distribution is highly unequal. In fact, the elite rule may be undermined by legal development because the income inequality falls when the legal quality improves; the reason is that a better legal system, by providing all agents with cheaper and more equal access to new trade opportunities, makes the quality of their initial matches less important and thus dampens the income gaps between the elite and the rest. So we have a circle of economic, political, and legal conditions: high income inequality gives rise to the elite rule, which slows down the legal development, and the low legal quality helps preserve the high income inequality. Similar arguments suggest the existence of the opposite circle of low income inequality, democracy, and high legal quality.
This implies that the initial income inequality may account for the di¤erent political regimes and the subsequent divergence in legal development across societies. 3 This paper contributes to the literature by developing a political economy model to account for why the relative usage of relational and legal contracts di¤ers across societies.
It suggests that higher inequality in the initial endowment is more likely to give rise to elite rule, which leads to slower legal development and more prevalence of relational contracts. In a related study, Besley and Ghatak (2008) examine whether a one-shot costless legal reform that enhances the use of formal collateral will be adopted by producers and suppliers. Similar to the current paper, they also …nd that a determining force in the legal reform is whether the traditional elite who bene…t most from relational networks are politically dominant. Their emphasis, however, is on the role of legal reform in improving property rights, while the current paper focuses on whether legal contract enforcement will be adopted in di¤erent societies. Greif (2005) stresses the dynamic interplay between con-2 This result is consistent with the comment of an in ‡uential observer: "Those in power have no need of courts and laws to have their way; it is the poor and the weak who do. Anyone who doubts this proposition has only to compare the general condition and the sense of security of the lower orders in areas with weak legal traditions, as for example south-east Asia, with those like western Europe and the United States where they are deeply entrenched." (Pipes, 1995, p. 289) . 3 The importance of income inequality in political development is demonstrated by Sokolo¤ (2002, 2005) among others.
tract enforcement institutions and property rights institutions, especially the importance of coercive constraint institutions in facilitating legal development. The current paper explains the variation of legal development across societies from a di¤erent angel by focusing on the heterogenous returns among agents from using relational and legal contracts. Dhillon and Rigolini (2006) …nd that legal corruption is higher and consumers invest more in getting information about …rms'reputations when there are more productivity shocks; they do not touch upon the political economy of improving legal contract enforcement.
A number of papers analyze the comparative advantages of di¤erent enforcement institutions. Sobel (2006) contrasts relational contracts and legal institutions in supporting bilateral relationships. Li (2003) proposes that using impersonal legal enforcement involves a large …xed cost to set up but its marginal cost is small relative to relational contracts. Dixit (2003) explores how the relative advantage of informal multilateral enforcement versus external enforcement changes as trade expands. Cooter and Landa (1984) show that improvements in contract law reduce the equilibrium size of trading groups. Kranton (1996a) …nds that ine¢ cient outcomes may emerge in a situation where agents can move between markets and relational networks. See MacLeod (2007) and Dixit (2009) for more related work. None of these studies endogenizes legal quality, which is the main focus of the current paper.
This paper proceeds as follows. The formal political economy model is set up in the next section. Relational and legal contracts are analyzed in Section 3, while the legal quality is endogenized in Section 4. Some extensions are provided in Section 5. The …nal section concludes the paper.
The Model
There is a continuum of agents with a unit mass who live in…nitely. A small proportion r of agents are the elite, each endowed with wealth w e and education h e , while the others belong to the poor masses, each endowed with a smaller wealth w m and low education h m ,
where w e > w m > 0 and h e > h m > 0.
The model contains two phases. In the …rst phase, the legal quality q of contract enforcement is determined through a political process; it is taken as given in the second phase, when agents match with each other into pair-wise partnerships to carry out projects.
Legal Investment. The general quality q of the legal system is chosen to maximize the total welfare of the politically dominant interest group, while the cost is equally shared among all agents. The cost function of legal investment is C(q); where C 0 (q) > 0 and C 00 (q) > 0. Without any investment, the initial legal quality is zero. The cost of improving the general quality of the legal system is presumably composed of writing the legal rules and training judges, lawyers, and the police force, etc. Though these details are not explicitly modeled in the paper, the overall e¤ectiveness of them is indicated by q 0.
Repeated Matching Game. The second phase of the model can be described as a repeated matching game. Agents match with each other to play a two-player repeated game, which can be interpreted as engaging in a business partnership. In each period, a match continues if both players agree to participate, and it breaks up if either one wishes to do so.
Stage Game. In a match, agents play the prisoner's dilemma (PD) described in Table   1 . When both agents cooperate in the project, each gets a return of a > 0, which represents the gains from trade for both players. If one agent cooperates but the other defects, the cooperator gets a negative payo¤ d < 0 while the cheater gets a higher return a + b, where b > 0 represents the temptation of cheating; cheating is bad for the total surplus, which is captured by the assumption 2a > a + b d > 0. If both agents defect, then each gets a return of zero, which is the normalized return of going autarky. 
Learning-by-Doing. After a partnership is formed for some time, the gains from trade may be improved through learning-by-doing, and the improvement scale increases in the education levels of the two partners. In particular, the return from the partnership becomes a(1 + g(h 1 ; h 2 )) from the second period onwards after the partnership is formed, where g 1 , g 2 > 0 and g 12 0. So agents prefer to have a more educated partner, which will lead to perfect sorting such that elite agents match among themselves and so do non-elite agents. 4 It is thus useful to denote g e g(h e ; h e ) and g m g(h m ; h m ); it is clear that g e > g m holds based on the properties of g(h 1 ; h 2 ). Since the temptation of cheating remains b as before, the payo¤ for the cheater in the stage game becomes a(1 + g i ) + b in an established match where i 2 fe; mg.
New Trade Opportunity. In each period, the gains from trade in a new match stay the same at a with probability , where 2 (0; 1). With probability 1 , there is an exogenous shock that increases the gains from trade for newly-formed partnerships from a to a(1 + ") for the …rst N periods, where " > 0, after which the gain from trade goes back to normal, that is, it becomes a(1 + g i ). This is meant to capture the in ‡uence of new trading opportunities that are exogenously determined and beyond the control of agents. Without much loss of generality, we assume N = 1 to simplify the analysis. 5 As the shocks do not change the temptation of cheating b, the payo¤ for cheating in the stage game becomes a(1 + ") + b when the gain from trade is a(1 + ").
Information. There is no information transmission across matches. Agents know the quality of their current match, the past actions of their own and their partners within the matches. They cannot access information about the past actions of any other agents. Since the population of agents is large, we neglect the possibility that any two agents have met before. Unmatched agents can …nd a new partner without cost. 6 Strategy and Equilibrium. In each period of a match, an agent's strategy speci…es an action in the above PD game, i.e. to cooperate or to defect, followed by a decision of whether to continue or to break up the partnership. Agents choose strategies to maximize the discounted sum of their stage-game payo¤s, net of contracting costs if any, where the common discount factor is 2 (0; 1): The paper focuses on subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcomes, where an agent discontinues a partnership only if doing so gives him a better payo¤ than otherwise.
Relational Contract. In particular, we study two types of enforcement institutions (which are SPE) that enable agents to cooperate. One is a long-term relational contract that demands both agents to always cooperate and to continue the partnership regardless of exogenous shocks, and if any agent defects, it dissolves automatically at no cost to both agents. To deter cheating, each agent in the partnership has to incur a sunk cost R upfront, which cannot be recovered once the relationship stops. 7 The expenditure R can be interpreted as the cost of building the relationship, such as exchanging gifts or bonds, or spending time and resources participating social activities, which are quite common procedures of initiating business relationships in many societies. This means that, if an agent breaks the current partnership and forms a new one with a stranger, he must pay R again for the new partnership, otherwise he has to face the risk of being cheated.
Legal Contract. The other type of enforcement is to sign a short-term formal legal contract that mandates cooperation during the match, punishes cheating but allows agents 5 Assuming N > 1 or N = +1 will not change the main qualitative results. 6 When there is an endogenous matching cost, the qualitative results remain unchanged (see Sobel 2006 ).
The information transmission assumption will be relaxed in Section 5.2 when social communities are discussed. 7 The observation that imposing costs at the beginning of a relationship can lead to e¢ ciency gains is also made by Carmichael and MacLeod (1997) and Kranton (1996b) .
to break up when a new match becomes more productive. 8 If a pair of players each takes a cost c to write a contract, the court identi…es cheating when it occurs with probability Q(c; q); where q denotes the general quality of the legal system. In real life, for example, the related cost of writing and using legal contracts includes the e¤ort to specify and follow appropriate procedures in order to produce adequate evidence for the legal court to verify whether cheating has happened and to carry out possible punishment; a higher cost may imply a greater amount of documents or information to be presented or exchanged before payment is to be made or goods are to be delivered, which should increase the probability of cheating being veri…ed and punished by the legal court. Similarly, such a probability is also higher when the legal system is more e¤ective. So we assume Q c ; Q q > 0; and Timing. The timing of this repeated game can be summarized as follows. Players form pairs with each other through random matching within their respective groups, and subject to mutual agreement, partners choose to adopt either a relational contract or a legal contract, and then behave accordingly. A match breaks up automatically once unexpected cheating occurs or at least one player decides to dissolve it. Players exiting from an old relationship form new matches, and then the same action sequence described above follows.
Relational and Legal Contracts
The model is analyzed using backward induction. This section focuses on the second phase of the model, namely the repeated matching game, while taking the legal quality q as given;
it examines how agents adopt di¤erent contracts that are indeed subgame perfect equilibria under certain conditions.
Long-Term Relational Contracts
Suppose a pair of elite agents choose a long-term relational contract that does not dissolve due to exogenous shocks. Since the relational contract demands cooperation in all periods, 8 In addition to these two types of contracts that are the focus of this paper, it is possible to have other contract formats such as short-term relational contracts and long-term legal contracts, which are, however, less commonly used. The working paper version of this paper includes them and the main results are similar. 9 Other reasonable assumptions about the court's decision, as long as the cheating behavior is punished, will not alter the main results.
where the return is a in the …rst period and a(1 + g e ) afterwards, the value of such a new match is equal to
When the initial gain from trade is a(1 + ") followed by periods with a return of a(1 + g e ),
the value of a new match is
It is easy to see that V ne = V ce + a".
Let R ce denote the cost of relationship building when the initial return is a, and R ne denote the same cost when the initial return is a(1 + "). 
is obtained by forming a new match in the next period: with probability the gain from trade remains the same so the net value of a new match is again V ce R ce , while with probability 1 the gain from trade increases to a(1 + ") so the value of a new match is V ne R ne . Cheating is not pro…table when cooperation yields a higher return than defecting, which is the case when V ce R ce a + b R ce + EV e holds, which boils down to,
Suppose in the nth period the partnership is still not broken, where n 2. If an agent cooperates in the PD game, he gets a payo¤ a(1 + g e )=(1 ); if he defects, his payo¤ is
which leads to the same condition (2) as in a new match. The reason is that the bene…t of cheating remains the same in both cases.
The possible one-shot deviations are similar when the initial gain from trade is a(1 + "), where deviation is not pro…table when (2) is satis…ed. So as long as R ce ; R ne R e , where
is de…ned by (2) at equality, no agents have incentives to defect. R e is thus the minimum cost of using the long-term relational contract to achieve cooperation. It is smaller when the temptation of cheating b is lower, when agents are more patient (i.e. when is bigger), when the old partnership is more productive (g e higher), and when the productivity increase in a new match is lower (a" smaller) and less frequent (1 smaller).
Another condition for the long-term relational contract to be a subgame perfect equilibrium is that it must be desirable to continue the old match even when a new match becomes more productive. The net value of starting a new match is V ne R e when the gain from trade is a(1 + "), while the value of continuing with the old match for another period is a(1 + g e )=(1 ). So it is optimal for agents to keep the old match when a(1 + g e )=(1 ) V ne R e , which boils down to
This condition is satis…ed obviously when " g e . When R e is plugged in, the condition becomes " b= a;
where b= a is the threshold level of productivity shock, below which elite agents do not have incentives to dissolve the match. In other words, when " b= a, the productivity increase in the new trade opportunities is too low to compensate for the loss of the relationship building cost and the productivity gain due to learning-by-doing in the old match. As the case for non-elite agents is similar, we have proved the following lemma.
Lemma 1
The long-term relational contract is a subgame perfect equilibrium when " b= a, where the relationship building cost for an elite agent is R e in (3) and for a non-elite agent is R m b= ag m + a(1 )".
Short-Term Legal Contracts
Suppose a pair of elite agents choose to adopt a short-term legal contract that punishes cheating but allows agents to break up at the beginning of a period when a new match is more productive. Let c e denote the cost of writing a legal contract to deter cheating when the initial return is a, and c ne denote the same cost when the initial return is a(1 + ").
The value of a new match with return a is denoted by b V ce on the equilibrium path. When players cooperate in a new match, they get a immediately, followed by a continuation value
where with probability agents stay in the same match and get a value b V ge , while with probability 1 the old match dissolves as a result of the positive productivity shock " and thus agents form a new match with others to get b V ne c ne . That is
The continuation value b V ge is determined in a similar way, the only di¤erence is that the current return is a(1 + g e ) due to learning-by-doing in the same match:
EV e : So it is obvious that b
b V ne is the value of starting a new match when the gain from trade is a(1+"), which happens with probability 1 . This means b V ne = a(1 + ") + EV e . It is easy to see that
From equations (5), (6), and (7), we get
Let's check the possible one-shot deviation when the initial gain from trade is a. In a new match, if an agent cooperates, the match will continue where he gets b V ce c e . If he cheats, he gets payo¤ (a + b)(1 Q(c e ; q)) + E b V e c e , where the …rst term is his expected current payo¤, and E b V e is the continuation value in the next period when he becomes an unmatched player since his partner will break up the partnership according to the contract.
The expected value of entering a new match is
since the net value of starting a new match when the gain from trade is a is b V ce c e , which occurs with probability , while with probability 1 the new match is more productive and yields a net value b V ne c ne . Cheating is thus not optimal when (a + b)(1 Q(c e ; q)) b V ce E b V e holds, which is simpli…ed to
In the nth period when the partnership is still not broken, where n 2, the one-shot deviation is less pro…table than in the …rst period. If an agent cooperates in the PD game, he gets a payo¤ b V ge ; if he defects, his payo¤ is
will not defect if
which is satis…ed when (9) holds.
De…ne b c Le to make the equality in (9) hold and we get
the minimum cost to use the legal contract when the legal quality is q and the initial gain from trade is a.
Lemma 2 @b c Le =@q < 0; @b c Le =@g e < 0; @b c Le =@" = 0:
Proof. In the Appendix.
This lemma shows that when the legal quality q is lower, in order to deter cheating agents need to spend more resources in writing a more detailed contract and so the cost b c Le is higher. Similar as in the case of a relational contract, b c Le is larger when the old match is less productive (g e lower) and when the temptation of cheating b is larger. However,
while R e increases with ", b c Le is independent of it, because the legal contract allows the old match to dissolve once new matches become more productive; in other words, agents adopting short-term legal contracts do not need to face the pressure of maintaining the relatively less productive old match while those using long-term relational contracts have to.
Another condition for the short-term legal contract to be a subgame perfect equilibrium is that it must be desirable to break up the old match when a new match becomes more productive. The net value of starting a new match is b V ne c ne when the initial return is a(1 + "), while the value of continuing with the old match for another period is b V ge . So it is optimal for agents to dissolve the old match when b V ne c ne b V ge holds, which boils down to c ne a(" g e ):
So when " g e , it is never optimal to dissolve the match; this is consistent with (4), where a(" g e ) is also the threshold level of relational building cost, above which players will not break up the old match. Let e c Le denote the minimum cost of using legal contract when the initial return is a(1 + "); its level can be determined using similar arguments as above.
And similar conditions hold for non-elite agents. These are formally proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The short-term legal contract is a subgame perfect equilibrium for an elite agent when the legal cost is b c Le in (10) and when " " Le , where
and e c Le is uniquely determined by
The same is true for a non-elite agent when the legal cost is b c Lm and when " " Lm , where
And " Lm < " Le < b= a.
Since b= a is the threshold level of " below which the long-term relational contract is SPE, the condition " Lm < " Le < b= a suggests that legal contracts enable agents to break up old matches more often than relational contracts in order to take advantage of new opportunities. It also implies that the elite agents are less likely to break up a match than the non-elite ones mainly because the gains from trade in the established matches (represented by a(1 + g e )) are higher for elite agents but both types of agents are faced with the same new trading opportunities.
Investment in Legal Quality
This section analyzes the …rst phase of the model where the legal quality q is endogenized in a political economy context. Speci…cally, the politically dominant interest group chooses the legal quality to maximize its joint welfare while taking into consideration the e¤ect of legal quality on its expected returns in the subsequent repeated matching game. Without any investment, the initial legal quality is zero and thus all agents use relational contracts.
So the legal investment, if ever made, has to be large enough to make agents willing to shift from relational to legal contracts.
Recall from the preceding section that the net value of using short-term legal contracts for an elite agent is b V ce b c Le while that of long-term relational contracts is V ce R e . So the bene…t of switching from relational to legal contracts is the di¤erence between these two net values:
The same is true for the masses. So for both types of agents i 2 fe; mg we have
Lemma 4 The bene…t of switching from relational to legal contracts is larger when " and q are higher and when g i is lower; that is, @ (q; "; g i )=@" > 0, @ (q; "; g i )=@q > 0 and @ (q; "; g i )=@g i < 0 for i 2 fe; mg. Since g e > g m , the elite agents bene…t less from switching to legal contracts than others so that (q; "; g e ) < (q; "; g m ):
This lemma shows that it is more bene…cial to use short-term legal contracts when " is higher and when g e or g m is lower. The intuition is as follows. In the face of a positive productivity shock ", whether or not to break up the old match depends on how large g i is relative to ", since the trade-o¤ is between a long-term partnership that enjoys productivity improvement through learning-by-doing versus a new partnership that promises higher gains from trade due to new trade opportunities. And the bene…t of breaking up the old match is larger when " is higher and when g i is smaller. While all agents face the same productivity shock ", the elite agents have comparative advantages in using long-term relational contracts due to g e > g m , and as a result they are less willing to adopt legal contracts than the nonelite agents. This is the main insight that is underlying the di¤erent incentives for legal investment.
Social Optimal Legal Investment
The social optimal level of legal investment is determined to maximize the aggregate welfare of all agents. The total bene…t of increasing the legal quality from 0 to q is r (q; "; g e ) +
(1 r) (q; "; g m ) if all agents shift from long-term relational contracts to short-term legal contracts and is (1 r) (q; "; g m ) if only the non-elite agents do so. The total cost C(q) is equally shared among all agents. So the social optimal legal quality q s , if positive, is de…ned by q s arg max q (1 r) (q; "; g m ) + maxf0; r (q; "; g e )g C(q):
The social optimal legal investment should be zero if the aggregate welfare is non-positive.
Since both (q; "; g e ) and (q; "; g m ) are strictly increasing in ", there must exist a unique level " s such that
So " s is the social optimal threshold level of ", above which legal investment starts.
Proposition 1
In the social optimal case, the legal investment is zero when " " s , and becomes positive when " > " s , in which case the legal quality q s is uniquely determined by
if (q s ; " s ; g e ) 0 and by
if otherwise, where @" s =@g i 0, @q s =@" = 0, and @q s =@g i 0 for i 2 fe; mg.
This proposition suggests that the threshold level of productivity shocks " s for a society to start legal investment is higher and the social optimal legal quality q s is lower when the productivity of established matches represented by g e or g m is higher. If " is drawn from some exogenous distribution F ( ), the probability of investing in legal quality is 1 F (" s ),
which is lower if g e or g m is higher. So in the social optimal case, a society is less likely to invest in legal quality and invests less if ever investing, when agents are relatively more productive in established partnerships and hence the long-term relational contracts are more e¤ective in achieving cooperation.
Legal Investment under Elite Rule
A society is under the elite rule when the elite group is politically dominant. The total bene…t for the elite group from increasing the legal quality is r (q; "; g e ) while the cost it has to pay is rC(q), since the total cost C(q) is shared among all agents where the elite group is of r proportion. 10 So the optimal legal quality q e under the elite rule is q e arg max q r (q; "; g e ) rC(q)
if the total welfare of the elite group max q (q; "; g e ) C(q) is positive, and q e is 0 if otherwise. Since (q; "; g e ) is strictly increasing in ", there must exist a unique level " e such that (q e ; " e ; g e ) C(q e ) = 0:
Then the legal investment is zero when " " e , and it becomes positive only when " > " e , in which case the legal quality q e is uniquely determined by 1 (q e ; "; g e ) C 0 (q e ) = 0:
1 0 The legal investment cost C(q) can be paid by tax revenues generated from the population. Here it is assumed that each agent pays the same amount of tax. Alternative cost-sharing methods should not change the main results. For example, in the extreme case where the elite agents are required to pay nothing for legal investment, they will not start it unless (q; "; ge) 0, but the social optimal legal development may start even when (q; "; ge) < 0 is true. And more importantly, there is always an opportunity cost of improving legal quality, since the tax revenues can be used in other ways to increase the elite's utility. In this sense, legal investment is always costly from the elite's perspective.
Proposition 2 Under the elite rule, the threshold productivity shock " e to start legal investment is higher and the legal quality q e is lower than in the social optimal case, and the more so when g e is higher; that is, q e < q s , " e > " s , @" e =@g e > 0 and @q e =@g e < 0.
This proposition suggests that the elite are less likely to invest in legal quality and invest less if ever investing, when they are relatively more productive in established partnerships.
And compared with the social optimal case, the legal quality is lower and the threshold productivity shock needed to start legal investment is higher under the elite rule. So the legal development is slower under the elite rule than in the social optimal case, and thus agents are more likely to use relational contracts and less likely to use legal contracts.
Legal Investment under Majority Rule
Under the majority rule, the group of non-elite agents is politically dominant and thus chooses an optimal legal quality to maximize the overall welfare of its group members. The same results will go through if the median voter of the population decides the optimal legal investment to maximize his own welfare, since all non-elite agents are identical and they constitute the majority. So the legal quality under democracy with majority voting will be the same. The analysis is similar to that under the elite rule. The optimal legal quality q m under the majority rule is q m arg max q (1 r) (q; "; g m ) (1 r)C(q)
if max q (1 r) (q; "; g m ) (1 r)C(q) > 0, and it is 0 if otherwise. The legal investment is zero when " " m , and becomes positive when " > " m , where " m is uniquely determined by
The legal quality q m is thus positive when " > " m , and is uniquely determined by
Proposition 3 Under the majority rule, the threshold productivity shock " m to start legal investment is lower and the legal quality q m is higher than in the social optimal case, and the more so when g m is lower; that is, q m > q s > q e , " m < " s < " e , @" m =@g m > 0, and @q m =@g m < 0.
Proof. In the Appendix. This proposition suggests that, compared with the social optimal case, the legal quality under majority rule is larger and the threshold productivity shock needed to start legal investment is lower. In other words, a society under the majority rule may overinvest in legal quality than the social optimal level. This is not surprising, since the poor, who are more disadvantaged under the long-term relational contracts than the elite, can enjoy more bene…ts from utilizing new trade opportunities when the cost of using legal contracts becomes cheap enough.
Implications
Depending on the level of ", the legal development may di¤er across political regimes. There are three possible scenarios, which are illustrated in Figure 1 and analyzed below. Case 1. " " m : There is no legal investment in any political system so that q m = 0 = q e and only long-term relational contracts are used. The income inequality, as represented by the income gap G 1 between the two types of agents, is the largest, where
is derived from results in the last section.
Case 2. " m " " e : There is still no legal investment under the elite rule, but a society under the majority rule will start to invest in the legal system so that q m > 0 = q e . As a result, the non-elite agents adopt legal contracts and thus can take advantage of the new trade opportunities that are more productive, which decreases the income inequality. If the elite agents still use relational contracts, the income gap under majority rule becomes
= a(g e g m )=(1 ) (q m ; "; g m );
if the elite agents also adopt legal contracts, the income gap is even smaller:
It is easy to see that G 3 (q m ; ") < G 2 (q m ; ") < G 1 .
Case 3. " > " e : There is positive legal investment in both political systems, though the legal quality is higher under the majority rule than under the elite rule: q m > q e > 0. Since all agents use legal contracts to take advantage of new trade opportunities, the traditional advantage of the elite in terms of g e > g m becomes weaker than Case 2 and thus the income inequality is lower. The income gap is G 3 (q m ; ") under majority rule and G 3 (q e ; ") under elite rule, which are the smallest in the three cases. And the income gap is always lower under majority rule because G 3 (q m ; ") < G 3 (q e ; ") holds due to q m > q e .
An important implication from these scenarios is that as the productivity of new trade opportunities " become higher relative to that of established partnerships, it is more likely for legal development to start and for the legal quality to be higher. Another implication is that legal development often leads to lower income inequality, but legal development is less likely to occur under the elite rule than under democracy. So the elite rule, lower legal quality, and higher income inequality form an organic cluster of political and legal institutions with corresponding economic outcomes, while their opposites, namely democracy, higher legal quality, and lower income inequality form another cluster. These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4
The legal development is more likely to start when the exogenous productivity shock " is larger, and it leads to lower income inequality, regardless of political regimes.
When faced with the same ", the legal investment is less likely to start, the legal quality is lower, and the income inequality is higher under the elite rule than under democracy.
It is possible that, under the same political regime, di¤erent levels of legal development are caused purely by an arbitrarily small di¤erence in the exogenous productivity shock ".
Imagine two identical societies under the elite rule. One society experiences a slightly larger shock " = " e + u and thus invests in legal quality; the other society experiences a slightly smaller shock " = " e u and thus does not invest. Even if everything else is identical across the two societies, their economic outlooks are very di¤erent: the lucky society has a higher legal quality, its agents adopt legal contracts, its income distribution is more equal than the unlucky one.
Extensions and Discussions

Legal Investment with Endogenous Political System
Suppose the political system is determined by the balance of economic power among di¤erent groups (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) . When the total wealth of the elite agents is higher than that of the poor masses, the elite group is political dominant and the society is under the elite rule; if the opposite is true, then the society is democratic with majority voting.
The political system is determined both before and after the legal investment decision, since the income distribution may change if the legal quality changes.
When the political dominance has to be backed up by economic strength, we can show that the elite are even less willing to invest in legal quality because their relative economic power is likely to be weakened as a result of legal development. When the legal quality is zero, all agents use long-term relational contracts and get corresponding returns V ce R e or V cm R m in addition to their endowed wealth w e or w m ; so the elite rule happens if
The elite rule continues automatically if there is no legal reform, since the income distribution remains the same. If the legal quality is increased to q > 0 and all agents switch from relational to legal contracts, the elite rule continues if
Note that (19) implies (18), which means that legal investment weakens the economic power of the elite. Let
then ( 
Proposition 5 Legal development weakens the elite rule but solidi…es democracy, since
Y 0 (q) < 0. Speci…cally, the legal quality can never reach above q under the elite rule, where
This proposition suggests that the elite rule survives only when, and it is more secure when q is lower; on contrary, democracy arises when q > q and it is solidi…ed when q is higher. This means that, when the political system is endogenously determined, q is the highest possible legal quality that can sustain the elite rule. So even if the elite choose to start the legal development process, it is slower than the social optimal case and can never increase above certain threshold q.
The endogenization of political regimes further strengthens the relationship between the elite rule, lower legal quality, and higher income inequality by making them mutually reinforcing; it is not only the case that the elite rule leads to slower legal development and hence higher income inequality, but also true is the opposite direction where higher income inequality leads to the elite rule, which completes the self-perpetuating circle. The other cluster of lower income inequality, democracy, and higher legal quality also forms a selfperpetuating circle with mutually reinforcing elements. One can imagine that, if " increases over time, it is possible for the circle of elite rule to persist for a long period and then eventually transits to the democracy circle of institutions, though the detail is best left for future research.
Contract Enforcement with Social Communities
In the basic model, agents are atomic individuals without stable connections among each other except for the bilateral contracts between them, which is not true in real life where individuals belong to di¤erent communities. This assumption can be relaxed and our main results still go through and are even strengthened.
Suppose there are N e social communities within the elite group, where N e > 1 is a …nite integer. A social community could be a family, a kinship network, a clan, an ethnic group, a village or town, or a social club. Members in the same community have formed intricate social connections or developed valuable public goods before the game in the basic model starts. As a result, if a member cheats in the prisoner's dilemma as described in Table 1, his partner or the community can impose upon the defector some punishment x e > 0 with negligible cost. The punishment can take many forms. For example, in a well-organized social club where members enjoy certain privileges, anybody ever found cheating can be formally expelled from the club or informally shunned by other members (Bernstein 1992 ); neighbors in a small village or members of a close-knit group typically interact with each other in many di¤erent ways or even across generations, which provide ample opportunities to punish someone who has cheated (Ellickson 1991 ).
This means dealing with a partner from the same community is less risky or less costly than dealing with somebody from outside. It is essentially equivalent to reducing the temptation of cheating in the PD game from b to b x e for agents in the same communities.
Another interpretation is that community members have formed multilateral relationships with each other that is worth x e and can be carried on across partnerships. This makes it less costly for agents to break up bilateral relational contracts in order to capture higher gains from trade arising in new partnerships. So in some sense, a part of the bene…t of long-run relationship switches from the bilateral partnership to the community level, where agents can change partners when new matches become more productive but still remain in the multilateral environment of the same community. In other words, the long-term relationship building is now within the border of community instead of the much narrower bilateral relations between two atomic individuals. As a consequence, trade e¢ ciency will be enhanced, which is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 6
The existence of social communities improves trading e¢ ciency over bilateral relational contracts by reducing relationship building costs and encouraging new partnership formation to achieve higher gains from trade. Speci…cally, if partners belong to the same communities, the minimum relational building cost to maintain a long-term relational contract is b R e (b x e )= ag e + a(1 )"; (20) and the cost of a short-term relational contract that automatically breaks up when a new match becomes more productive is
The short-term relational contract is more pro…table than the long-term ones when
Proof. It is straightforward to derive conditions (20) and (22) following similar arguments as in Section 3.1. It is shown in the Appendix that (21) can be derived from similar arguments as in Section 3.2, where
is the corresponding minimum cost of using the short-term relational contract in the basic model where communities do not exist. Communities improve trade e¢ ciencies in several scenarios, which are summarized in Table 2 . 
Detailed technical steps are in the Appendix. The case for non-elite agents is similar and thus omitted.
There is, however, a potential drawback for contract enforcement in communities because it makes agents reluctant to trade with outsiders, which becomes more relevant when new partnerships are more productive between agents from di¤erent communities than those within the same communities. A competent legal system is thus needed to facilitate trading among agents across communities.
Suppose in every period the gain from trade is a with probability in all new partnerships, while with probability 1 the gain from trade is a(1 + ") as before for new partnerships within the same community but increases to a(1 + " + ) for those across different communities, where > 0 indicates the extra gain in productivity from matching with strangers. Similar arguments as in the basic model can be used to show that only when is large enough will legal investment starts. Furthermore, if x e > x m so that the elite agents are better at enforcing multilateral relationships in communities, they will be even less willing to invest in legal quality than in the basic model.
Using short-term legal contracts enable agents to form partnerships with individuals from di¤erent communities in order to capture the higher gains from trade. The net bene…t of doing so is e (q; g e ; x e ; ) b
b c Le for an elite agent, where b V sce is the same as b V ce in (8) except by replacing " by " + . It is easy to see that @e (q; g e ; x e ; )=@x e < 0 holds, which means that the bene…t of using legal contracts is lower when x e is higher or when the communities are more e¤ective in enforcing relational contracts. Let e q s denote the social optimal legal quality and s the threshold level of beyond which legal investment starts.
Proposition 7
The existence of social communities reduces the incentives of society to invest in legal quality, and the more so when x e and x m are larger. Speci…cally, s > " s and
This proposition suggests that, when social communities are more e¤ective in contract enforcement (when x e or x m is higher), a larger productivity gap s between matches within the community and those with outsiders is needed for society to start legal investment, and the gap is also larger than that in the basic model. Once the legal investment starts, however, the optimal legal quality is the same as in the basic model, since the legal system is treated as a complete substitute for communities in terms of contract enforcement. So legal development is likely to be slower when social communities are functioning better in facilitating relational contracts.
As in the basic model, it can be shown that the elite, who enjoy higher returns from informal relational contracts (indicated by higher g e and x e ), will have even less incentives than the poor masses in legal development. If some elite agents dwell in communities with
x m while some non-elites with x e , the con ‡ict of interests in terms of legal investment becomes more complicated than before, but the main results of the basic model (those who get higher returns from relational contracts are less interested in improving the legal quality, and if they are political dominant, the legal development is slower) remain unchanged.
Other Extensions and Discussions
The key insight of the paper is that the rich elite bene…t less from a competent legal system than the poor masses, which is derived from the result that richer agents enjoy comparative advantages in relational contracts due to better endowment or privileges. Many of our modeling choices can be relaxed or altered as long as this insight goes through.
Though we do not explicitly model the possibilities for the rich elite to take advantage of lawlessness or low legal quality, such as by engaging in rent-seeking activities or corruption, a similar force is implicitly built in the model, since the high education level of the rich elite can be interpreted as their privileges. This is further demonstrated by the fact that the aggregate income of the elite is more likely to be higher than that of the poor when legal quality is lower. That said, our model actually sends a more powerful message about the negative e¤ects of high income inequality on legal development than models that focus on corruptive or rent-seeking activities of the elite, since even the honest-dealing elite lack incentives to improve the law.
One assumption in the model that may look restrictive is that each agent works only in one project that is identical across agents. It can be relaxed to allow an agent to conduct multiple businesses that di¤er in returns and risks. For example, suppose each agent involves in n businesses with di¤erent shocks " i for i = 1; :::; n. As long as these projects are …nite and independent from each other, it can be accommodated in the model by assuming n duplicate agents each working in only one business. Following similar arguments as in the model, it can be shown that legal development is faster when a higher proportion of businesses have higher " i , while for a …xed legal quality q, those with lower " i adopt relational contracts while others prefer legal contracts. In this case, the con ‡ict of interests in legal investment is not only between the elite and the rest, it may also arise between agents faced with di¤erent levels of " i . The main results of the model go through as long as the larger shocks are not concentrating in the hands of the traditional elite, which seems to be consistent with reality where dominant incumbents are typically less prepared for seeking or adopting innovations.
The exogeneity of the productivity shocks " can also be relaxed. For example, one can imagine that in a closed society that has little contact with the outside world, " tends to be low, which implies that " < " e is more likely to happen where there are not su¢ cient incentives to start legal investment; and so the elite rule is easier to maintain. In an open society, however, it is possible to have " > " e , which may initiate the legal development that will eventually weaken the elite rule. So a society under elite rule is less likely to adopt an open policy than those under democracy, which means it is less likely to experience large productivity shocks and to feel the necessity of improving its legal system. If the political rent is large, which happens when land and other natural resources are abundant, the elite are more likely to adopt a closed-society policy in order to preserve the elite rule, and as a consequence, the legal development is further retarded.
Conclusions
Contract enforcement institutions are important for economic performance because most economic exchanges are subject to risk of default and the potential gains from trade may not be realized. This paper analyzes the di¤erences between legal contracts and relational contracts at both individual and communal levels, and …nds that a fundamental con ‡ict of interests in legal investment lies in the di¤erent returns of using relational and legal contracts across agents, where the traditional rich elite gain less from legal enforcement than the masses. In other words, it is the less well-connected poor masses that stand to gain most from having a competent legal system. And so it is not surprising that, if the rich elite are politically dominant and choose legal investment to maximize their own welfare, legal development tends to be slower than in the social optimal case.
Furthermore, it turns out that the elite rule, slow legal development, and high income inequality form a self-perpetuating circle. As legal enforcement provides a relatively more equal access to safeguarding partnerships against defecting than relational contracts, it helps reducing income inequality and thus may weaken the elite rule. Put in another way, lower legal quality helps preserve high income inequality, which in turn tends to give rise to the elite rule. This, combined with the result that the elite rule leads to slow legal development, suggests that these economic, political, and legal conditions belong to an organic cluster of institutions that generate and support each other in a mutually reinforcing way. It is straightforward to see that the opposite cluster of low income inequality, democracy, and high legal quality is also self-perpetuating. The transition between these two clusters is an intriguing topic that is worth pursuing in future research.
This paper also …nds that better functioning social communities help improve trade e¢ ciency in relational contracts and thus may also slow down legal development. This by itself, however, is not necessarily welfare reducing, since legal enforcement is only one alternative among many and its low usage can be the social optimal result of having better alternatives. Following the same logic as above, only when agents who belong to better communities dictate legal investment decisions would the resulted lower legal quality be sub-optimal. The enforcement quality of social communities is taken as exogenous in the paper, presumably as a side-e¤ect of other purposes served by communities. It might be useful in future research to endogenize the formation of communities to enhance its contract enforcement capabilities in a broad sense.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. Based on the identity c Le + ag e + (a + b)Q(b c Le ; q) b = 0, we get
and @b c Le =@" = 0:
Proof of Lemma 3. 
So c Le is the minimum cost of using the legal contract to deter cheating in a new match when the initial gain from trade is a(1 + "). Based on (23) and results in Lemma 2, it is straightforward to show that c Le < b c Le and @c Le =@" < 0, @c Le =@a < 0; and @c Le =@b > 0.
Similar arguments suggest that cheating is not pro…table in any nth period of a match where the initial gain of trade is a(1 + ") if
holds. So the minimum legal cost that deters cheating in an established match is e c Le that is determined by when the initial gain of trade is a(1 + "), the legal cost should be at least as large as e c Le to deter cheating when " > g e .
Next we prove " Le < b= a. This is indeed so because (24) and (25) imply that e c Le < c Le = b ag e (a(1 + g e ) + b)Q(e c Le ; q) b ag e ) e c Le < b ag e ) e c Le =a < b= a g e ; which leads to " Le g e + e c Le =a < b= a. Note that
Let's check whether @e c Le @g e =a > 1;
which is equivalent to j @e c Le @ge =aj < 1; this is indeed true because
So " Le > " Lm holds because @" Le @g e = 1 + @e c Le @g e =a > 0;
and g e > g m .
Proof of Lemma 4.
Proof. Comparing the legal cost c Le and the relationship building cost R e , we …nd that
Comparing the values of these two types of contracts, we …nd that
Note that
It is straightforward to see that
holds as both b c Le and e c Le are independent of ", and 
which is satis…ed under assumption (27) because Q 1 (e c Le ; q) > Q 1 (e c Le ; 0) due to Q 12 > 0.
and 
holds under assumption (27) for i = e; m. So q s is uniquely determined by (13) . Based on it we get the following comparative statistics:
where it can be shown that
is indeed true under assumption (27) . Then from (12) we get @" s @g e = r 3 (q s ; " s ; g e ) r 2 (q s ; " s ; g e ) + (1 r) 2 (q s ; " s ; g m ) > 0; where 3 < 0 and 2 > 0 are proved in Lemma 4. And Similarly @" s =@g m > 0 holds.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. The FOC for interior solutions is
The second order condition @ 2 (q; "; g e )@q 2 C 00 (q) < 0 is also satis…ed so that q e is uniquely determined by (15) . Based on it we get the following comparative statistics:
@q e @g e = @ 2 (q; "; g e ) @q@g e =( @ 2 (q; "; g e ) @q 2 C 00 (q) < 0; @q e @" = 0:
Then from (14) we get @" e @g e = 3 (q e ; " e ; g e ) 2 (q e ; " e ; g e ) > 0; where 3 < 0 and 2 > 0 are proved in Lemma 4.
Since 3 < 0 and g e > g m , we know 1 (q e ; "; g m ) > 1 (q e ; "; g e ), which implies that r 1 (q e ; "; g e ) + (1 r) 1 (q e ; "; g m ) C 0 (q) > 1 (q e ; "; g e ) C 0 (q e ) = 0, where the equality follows (15) . Compared with (13) , this means q e < q s ; that is, the legal quality under the elite rule is lower than the social optimal level.
Suppose " e " s holds; then 0 = r (q s ; " s ; g e ) + (1 r) (q s ; " s ; g m ) C(q s ) by (12)
> r (q e ; " s ; g e ) + (1 r) (q e ; " s ; g m ) C(q e ) since q s is the maximizer r (q e ; " e ; g e ) + (1 r) (q e ; " e ; g m ) C(q e ) if "
s " e and by 2 > 0 > (q e ; " e ; g e ) C(q e ) since g e > g m and by 3 < 0 = 0; by (14) which is not possible. Thus " e > " s must be true.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. The optimization part and comparative statics are similar to the above proof and can be easily derived based on the proof of Proposition 1. So they are omitted.
Since 3 < 0 and g e > g m , we know 1 (q m ; "; g e ) < 1 (q m ; "; g m ), which implies that r 1 (q m ; "; g e ) + (1 r) 1 (q m ; "; g m ) C 0 (q) < 1 (q m ; "; g m ) C 0 (q m ) = 0, where the equality follows (17) . Compared with (13) , this means q m > q s ; that is, the legal quality under the majority rule is larger than the social optimal level.
Suppose the opposite " m " s holds; then 0 = r (q m ; " m ; g m ) + (1 r) (q m ; " m ; g m ) C(q m ) by (17)
> r (q s ; " m ; g m ) + (1 r) (q s ; " m ; g m ) C(q s ) since q m is the maximizer > r (q s ; " m ; g e ) + (1 r) (q s ; " m ; g m ) C(q s ) since g e > g m and by 3 < 0 > r (q s ; " s ; g e ) + (1 r) (q s ; " s ; g m ) C(q s ) if " m " s and by 2 > 0 = 0 by (12);
which is not possible. Thus " m < " s must be true.
Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. We need to prove that condition (19) is more likely to hold when q is lower. = r 1 (q; "; g e ) (1 r) 1 (q; "; g m ) by (28)
< r[ 1 (q; "; g e ) (1 r) 1 (q; "; g m )] since r < 1 r; 1 (q; "; g m ) > 0 < 0 since g e > g m and 13 (q; "; g e ) < 0 by (28):
So @Y (q)=@q < 0; that is, Y (q) is less likely to be positive when q is higher.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Proof. This part of the proof focuses on calculating e R se , since other conditions can be obtained following exactly the same steps as in the text. When " > (b x e )= a, it is optimal to change partners when new matches become more productive. If so, the cost of relationship building is di¤erent. Following arguments in Section 3.2, the value of a newly formed match is e V ce = a + ( e V ge + (1 )( e V ne e R ne )) a + EV se ;
where EV se is the expected continuation value, and e V ge = a(1 + g e ) + EV se = ag e + e V ce ; e V ne = a(1 + ") + EV se = a" + e V ce :
So we get e V ce = a + ag e + (1 )(a" e R ne ) 1 :
Let's check the possible one-shot deviation when the initial gain from trade is a. since the net value of starting a new match when the gain from trade is a is e V ce e R ce , which occurs with probability , while with probability 1 the new match is more productive and yields a net value e V ne e R ne . Cheating will not happen when (a + b x e ) e V ce E e V ce = a + a e g e + e R ce ;
) a + b x e a + a e g e + e R ce ) e R ce (b x e )= ag e :
The same condition can also deter cheating when the initial gain from trade is a + ". So the minimum cost of using the short-term relational cost is e R se = (b x e )= ag e when partners belong to the same community. In the basic model, there is no community so that x e = 0, and thus the short-term relational cost is R se = b= ag e , which is larger than e R se .
The bene…t of the second case in Table 2 is calculated as follows.
e V ce e R se = a + ag e + (1 )(a" e R se ) 1 e R se = a(1 + g e ) + (1 )a" (1 )(b x e )= 1 ;
V ce R e = a(1 + g e ) 1 b= a"(1 ); e V ce e R se (V ce R e ) = (1 )(a" (b x e )= ) 1 + x e = :
Proof of Proposition 7.
Proof. The FOC for interior solutions is re 1 (e q s ; g e ; x e ; ) + (1 r)e 1 (e q s ; g m ; x m ; ) C 0 (e q s ) = 0;
where e 1 (e q s ; g e ; x e ; ) = where e 3 < 0 and e 4 > 0 are indeed true as both b c Le and e c Le are independent of and x e .
Similarly @ s =@x m > 0 holds. And s > " s holds because e (q; g e ; x e ; ) < (q; ; g e ), which is implied by e V ce e R se > V ce R e .
